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Abstract 
This project aims to examine a particular property of worry that some therapists 
claim interferes with the treatment of clients who worry. Research has shown that 
worry is predominately composed of concepts or thoughts rather than images 
(Borkovec & Hu, 1990). In particular this project aims to investigate whether the 
verbal linguistic nature of worry contributes to the sense that participants have 
that it is uncontrollable. Attempting to control an image results in a paradoxical 
effect of an increase in the frequency of the image (Wegner, Schneider, Carter & 
White, 1987). Does the same paradoxical effect occur when thoughts and not 
images are suppressed? This project seeks to determine whether there is a 
differential effect when personally relevant valenced thought and personally 
relevant valenced images are suppressed. To investigate whether a difference 
exists, 80 participants reported the number of intrusions of a self nominated 
positively or negatively valenced personally relevant mentation during an 10 
minute interval. A 2 (valence: negative, positive) x 2(mentation: image, thought) 
by 2 (thought instruction; suppress, free expression) Analysis of Covariance 
(ANCOV A) examined the difference in the immediate and subsequent effects that 
occur when individuals are instructed to suppress valenced personally relevant 
thoughts, as c_ompared to when individuals are instructed to suppress valenced 
personally relevant images. Results showed that there were no significant 
differences between the overall manipulation of thoughts and images during the 
testing interval. However, there was a significant interaction of thought instruction 
and type of mentation which resulted in a significantly lower number of intrusions 
(p=.004) for suppression of thoughts. A post hoc test on the interaction between 
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valence and thought instruction (p=. 051 ), for negatively valenced mentations 
revealed a significant decrease in the number of negative cognitions in the post 
suppression period (p = .027). All of this implies, firstly, that the conceptual nature 
of worry is unlikely to contribute to an appraisal of uncontrollability, and secondly, 
that suppression of negatively valenced mentation may be an effective way of 
reducing aversive intrusive activity. 
I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement 
any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any 
institution of higher education; and that to the best of my knowledge and 
belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by 
another person except where due reference is made in the text. 
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Does the Conceptual Nature of Worry Contribute to its 
Uncontrollability? Unravelling the Complex Interactions of Some of 
the Properties of Worry. 
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Very often therapists coach clients in techniques that are intended to help to 
control aversive mental activity. These techniques include simple coping 
techniques such as distraction or suppression (eg., thought stopping as in Dollard 
& Miller, 1950; Wolpe & Lazarus, 1966; Mathews & Milroy, 1994). However not 
all techniques achieve the desired results. For example, one aversive mental 
activity at which increased research is directed is worry, because techniques used 
to control worry have not always been effective, or even counter productive 
(Butler, 1994; Andrews, Crino, Hunt, Lampe & Page, 1994). Some have argued 
that this is due to one of the characteristics of worry, its conceptual nature ( eg. 
Roemer & Borkovec, 1993; Borkovec & Lyonfields, 1993). Is the conceptual 
nature of worry also responsible for the perceived uncontrollability of worry? 
The Conceptual Nature of Worry 
Borkovec and colleagues concluded that worry is composed principally of thought 
because of a number of experiments that originated from a initial study of insomnia 
(Gross & Borkovec, 1982). In the original experiment, they saw that cognitive 
intrusion just prior to sleep resulted in retardation of sleep onset. Three groups of 
good sleepers were brought into a lab and given instructions to fall asleep as 
quickly as possible. One group was told nothing further, the second group was 
told that as some stage they would be woken to give a speech. The third group 
was told that as some stage they would be woken to give a speech on "how to 
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reduce inflation without inducing depression". Gross and Borkovec ( 1982) found 
that participants in the third condition of cognitive intrusion manipulation took 
twice as long as the other two groups to fall asleep. This finding led to later 
experiments that attempted to look specifically at attempts to control the intrusive 
cognitive activity, which Borkovec and colleagues saw as worry. 
In a large community sample, Borkovec & Lyonfields (1993) found that 51 % 
rated worry as composed of thought, 3% rated worry as composed of images, and 
46% rated worry as composed of a combination of thought and images. 
Furthermore, they found that when 300 college students were given aforced 
choice format, 70% reported that worry was composed of thought, and 30% 
reported that worry was composed of images. This finding that worry is composed 
predominantly of thoughts confirmed the earlier findings ofBorkovec and Inz 
(1990). 
Borkovec and Inz (1990) compared the self report of matched non-anxious 
controls and clients with Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) during relaxation, 
directed worry and subsequent relaxation. Worry is defined as the cardinal feature 
of GAD (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Borkovec and Inz (1990) 
found that "relaxing" controls reported a vast amount of imagery and little 
thinking, whereas GAD clients reported equal amounts of each. When asked to 
engage in personally relevant worry, both groups (the "relaxing" controls and the 
clients with GAD) showed a shift to heightened frequency of thought and lowered 
frequency of imagery. When both groups returned to the relaxation condition, both 
reported a return to previous levels. 
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Other Properties of Worry 
Borkovec and colleagues argue that because worry is composed of thought 
rather than images it has additional properties. Specifically these properties have 
consequences for the treatment of worry or the treatment of anxiety disorders 
where worry is a major feature. I intend to discuss firstly the consequence of 
worry being composed of thought, and how the very nature of worry, its 
conceptual or thoughtlike structure, may interfere with treatment (Roemer & 
Borkovec, 1993; Borkovec & Lyonfields, 1993). The second important property 
that will be discussed is the uncontrollability of worry. I will then discuss the 
implications of attempts to control worry by addressing some of the relevant 
empirical findings of the suppression paradigm. It will be suggested that because 
worry is composed predominantly of thoughts rather than images, attempts to 
treat worry actually function to maintain worry. Attempts to control worry by 
suppressing worrisome thoughts may act to contribute to its uncontrollability. 
If Worry is Composed of Thought, What Does This Mean for the Treatment of 
Worry 
The discovery that worry is mainly composed of thought is important when 
considering treatment. Treating clients who worry or who have GAD has been 
shown to be difficult ( eg., Andrews et al., 1994; Roemer & Borkovec, 1993). 
One method of treatment that has been used is emotional processing (Foa & 
Kozak, 1986). The aim of emotional processing is to access the affective 
associative systems, thereby exposing the source of the fear that underlies the 
memory. This allows corrective information to change how the fearful stimuli 
should be viewed, which will eventually bring about habituation and a 
corresponding reduction in symptomatology (Foa & Kozak,1986). Exposure 
treatment is said to be effective only when the client emotionally processes the 
fearful stimuli (Foa & Kozak, 1986). Such processing is evidenced by a large 
initial physiological activation in response to the fearful material (Foa & Kozak, 
1986). When a client avoids a fear cue either behaviourally or cognitively, the 
associative network of threatening material surrounding the cue is not accessed 
and therefore cannot be modified with corrective information (F oa & Kozak, 
1986). 
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Roemer and Borkovec (1993) speculate that because worry is composed of 
thought, there are a number of consequences for treatment. Firstly, that for 
effective treatment of clients with an anxiety disorder (who concomitantly are 
experiencing worry), using emotional processing effectively is not possible because 
the conceptual (verbal linguistic) nature of worry prevents access to the affective 
associative network (Borkovec, Shadick & Hopkins, 1991; Roemer & Borkovec, 
1993). As a consequence, two things result: first, physiological activation does not 
occur as a response to the threatening stimuli, and second, corrective information 
does not get through to the affective network. 
The second important point is that although this process may be unconscious, 
the secondary gain of an absence of physiological activation may result in clients 
consciously using the conceptual nature of worry to avoid the aversive 
physiological symptoms that are the response to a fearful stimulus. That is, clients 
will engage in worry not simply to problem solve, but in order to avoid or gain 
relief from the aversive symptoms of anxiety (eg., Roemer & Borkovec, 1993). 
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Worry has certainly been found to suppress cardiovascular response to fearful 
stimuli. For example, Borkovec and Hu (1990) compared the cardiovascular 
response of three groups to a phobic stimulus. Prior to exposure, the groups were 
required to engage in neutral thinking, worrisome thinking or relaxation. They 
found that engaging in worrisome thinking before visualisation of a phobic image 
eliminated cardiovascular response to that image (Borkovec & Hu, 1990). 
Conversely, Wells (1994) argues that the reason that corrective information 
does not get through is not because of the conceptual nature of worry but because 
there is a capacity overload, and the resulting bottleneck does not allow for the 
encoding of the corrective information. 
Treating Worry 
It is important therefore in the treatment of anxiety disorders to treat worry 
first (Roemer & Borkovec,1993) because worry's conceptual nature may prevent 
access to the affective associative network. However, informal questioning of non 
pathological worriers carried out in pilot studies for research into the processes 
that people use to control worry suggest that the most common strategies these 
people use to control worry are distraction, problem solving and deciding not to 
worry (Butler, 1994). Are these strategies problematic when trying to treat worry? 
Distraction techniques are sometimes presented to clients in order to relieve 
clients of negative symptomatology (eg., Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). 
These techniques include diversion techniques such as instructing clients to 
concentrate on detail items in consultation rooms, and have been found to reduce 
negative thought frequency and reduced affect (Fennel & Teasdale, 1984; Fennel, 
------------------------------------------
Teasdale, Jones & Damle, 1987). They have not yet been shown to be effective 
with worry (Butler, 1994). 
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Other therapists argue that worry is actually exacerbated problem solving and 
that worriers have cognitive pre-dispositions that interfere with effective problem 
solving (Davey, 1994; Flett & Blankstein, 1994). Davey (1994) believes that 
worriers have a preponderance of negative cognitions, a tendency to interpret 
ambiguous events as threatening, and they have poor problem solving confidence. 
Accordingly, targeting these factors is an important approach in treatment, 
especially working on problem solving confidence (Davey, 1994). 
The third factor that the pilot study nominated was "deciding not to 
worry"(Butler, 1994). Is this strategy associated with the perception that worry is 
uncontrollable? 
The Uncontrollability of Worry 
The difficulty of controlling the process of worry is a property of worry that 
has been shown to be problematic with treatment in both normal and clinical 
populations (Borkovec et al, 1990; APA, 1994). There are a number of theoretical 
positions on this. Some argue that worriers cannot decide not to worry, because it 
will result in a paradoxical result such as the content of worry returning to mind, 
leading to a perception that worry is uncontrollable (Roemer & Borkovec, 1993). 
Others maintain that worry is initiated automatically, but that its processing is a 
consciously controlled process ( eg., Wells, 1994). Wells ( 1994) suggests that 
worry is a consciously controlled process. He believes that although it may be 
initiated automatically and involuntarily, it is a conscious controlled processing 
activity requiring large amounts of processing capacity. He suggests that one 
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reason for its uncontrollability is because of appraisals surrounding the involuntary 
initiation of worry. 
Alternatively, Roemer & Borkovec (1993) suggest that it is like telling people 
not to think of a white bear. When people are told not to think about a white bear, 
paradoxically they cannot do so (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). 
They report that during a period of attempted suppression of the image, the image 
of a white bear intrudes (Wegner et al, 1987). This increase in frequency of the 
image (relative to levels found when participants do not first suppress the thought) 
has been observed in a number of studies. The literature has reflected both an 
immediate increase in the frequency of the nominated mentation or a subsequent 
increase in the frequency of the nominated mentation after suppression has ceased. 
Perhaps during worry, in an attempt to suppress the frightening image or 
frightening thought, a process similar to the process of suppressing a white bear 
occurs; it becomes impossible, and multiple intrusions occur (Roemer & 
Borkovec, 1993). This argument has been supported by some studies. For 
example, Tallis, Davey and Capuzzo (1994) found that 75% of subjects in their 
study reported a paradoxical effect when they attempted to suppress worry. An 
important distinction, however, is that there is a difference in both the nature and 
the valence of a "white bear" and "worry" (Roemer & Borkovec, 1993 ). A white 
bear is a neutrally valenced image, and worry is a negatively valenced series of 
thoughts (Roemer & Borkovec, 1993). 
The Role of Cognitions in Anxiety 
It has been established that cognitive processes are implicated in anxiety 
disorders. Behavioural avoidance has been implicated in the maintenance of 
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phobias. For example, McNally and Steketee (1985) proposed that avoidance 
behaviour leads to fear maintenance. Cognitive avoidance such as suppression of 
specified mentations has empirically been shown to maintain and perhaps 
exacerbate anxiety disorders (eg., Zeitlen, Netten & Hodder, 1995). GAD is not 
the only disorder in which intrusive cognitions cause distress (Brown, Dowdall, 
Cote & Barlow, 1994). Disturbing, aversive, unwanted, intrusive mentations are 
also a common symptom of other psychological disorders such as Post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) and Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD; APA, 1994). 
Very often, clients with these disorders try to suppress the negatively valenced 
conceptual activity and/or the negatively valenced image without notable success. 
Many researchers have pointed out the utility of laboratory models of the aetiology 
of obsessions or worry or flashbacks ( eg., Wegner, 1989; Trinder & Salkovskis, 
1994; Zeitlin et al., 1995). The suppression paradigm has been suggested as one 
avenue for developing a laboratory model of certain anxiety disorders (eg., 
Wegner, 1989; Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994). 
Since the first experiment by Wegner et al. (1987) empirical research with the 
suppression paradigm has revealed information that may be helpful in developing 
models of psychopathology. This additional information may help us to understand 
more about the uncontrollability of worry. For example, if we establish there is a 
difference between the suppression of a thought as compared to suppression of an 
image, then it would also be useful to establish whether there is also a difference in 
the suppression ofvalenced mentation. 
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Review of the Suppression Paradigm 
Wegner et al. (1987) found that suppression of the images of white bears led to 
a rebound effect. While participants are suppressing a particular thought, they 
report fewer occurrences of that thought than participants who are not 
suppressing. However when they stop suppressing, they report more occurrences 
of the thought than people who did not suppress. This finding was replicated by 
Clark, Ball and Pape ( 1991 ), who used the stimulus of green rabbits with three 
groups who were required to verbalise their stream of consciousness for 2 two-
minute periods. In the first period, one group was ask~d to think about anything 
except green rabbits, the second group was asked to think about anything 
including green rabbits, and the third group was asked to think about anything at 
all. In the second period, all groups were asked to think about anything at all. 
Consistent with the rebound effect, the first group reported significantly fewer 
images of green rabbits than the other two groups in the first period, and they 
reported significantly more images of the green rabbits in the second period. 
In contrast to this finding by Wegner et al. ( 1987) and Clark et al ( 1991) of a 
rebound effect, others ( eg., Lavy and van den Hout, 1990 and Merckelbach, Muris, 
van den Hout and de Jong , 1991) found an immediate enhancement effect during 
the suppression period. An enhancement effect differs from a rebound effect by 
virtue of when the paradoxical effect occurs. With a rebound effect there is a 
paradoxical effect evident in the post suppression period, whereas with an 
enhancement effect there is a paradoxical effect immediately apparent in the 
suppression period itself 
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There continues to be no clear consistency as to when a rebound effect or 
enhancement effect occurs (Muris, Merckelbach, van den Hout & de Jong, 1992). 
Some researchers (eg., Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994) have argued that suppression 
is most likely a continuous process. They suggest it is unlikely that people are able 
to suppress a particular mentation for a period only to have it return in greater 
numbers. As such, the enhancement effect may be an explanation that may be 
applicable to models of psychological disorders such as OCD in which intrusive 
thoughts are prominent (Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994). 
Experiencing unwanted intrusive thoughts has been found to be experienced by 
80% of the nonclinical population (Rachman and de Silva, 1978). The similarity 
between normal intrusive thoughts and clinical intrusive thoughts led Rachman 
(1978) to speculate that normal intrusive thoughts may play a role in the aetiology 
of OCD. This was later extended by Salkovskis (1985, 1989) in a cognitive 
behavioural hypothesis of OCD. It was argued that the initial appraisal of an 
intrusive thought led to beliefs of personal responsibility based on the content of 
the intrusion, and subsequently to compensatory behaviours. Appraisal is central 
to his hypothesis (Salkovskis, 1989). Trinder and Salkovskis (1994) also noted the 
role that appraisal of initial intrusions may have in the development of disorders 
such as OCD and PTSD 
Wegner (1988, 1989) argues that the rebound effect represents a laboratory 
model of the aetiology of real life obsessions. This is in line, he argues, with the 
clinical studies that show abnormal obsessions are accompanied by an urge to 
resist or suppress the intrusive thoughts (eg., Rachman & de Silva, 1978). 
However, the parallel between the rebound/enhancement effect and abnormal 
18 
obsessions is not as clear cut. Until clear predeterminates exist it is hard to extend 
the findings in the suppression paradigm to other models of psychological 
disorders. Zeitlin et al (1995) observe that determining whether there is a rebound 
effect or an enhancement effect may depend on the clinical disorder. For example, 
clinical reports of OCD and PTSD patients suggest that attempts to suppress 
intrusive mentations result in an immediate increase in their occurrence (Zeitlin et 
al, 1995). 
The Role of the Valence of the Mentation Affecting a Rebound and/or an 
Enhancement Effect 
Some studies have indicated the valence and the personal relevance of the 
mentation are implicated in the paradoxical result of attempts at suppression of 
intrusive thoughts. For example, Muris et al.(1992) found the valence of the 
mentation may influence whether there is a rebound effect. They found a clear 
difference in an experiment in which one group was required to suppress valenced 
material and another group was required to suppress neutral material. They found 
that the immediate enhancement effect seems to be limited to situations in which 
suppression is directed at neutral material. This finding is in accordance with the 
findings of Lavy and van den Hout (1990) who found an immediate enhancement 
effect when participants were instructed to suppress neutral thoughts (sic) about a 
vehicle. 
These findings were in line with others. Wegner and Gold (1992) looked at the 
application of suppression to participant's own thoughts of a previous romantic 
partner. Participants were divided into two groups: those who were to suppress 
thoughts of a still desired previous romantic partner (a "hot flame") and those who 
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were to suppress thoughts of a no longer desired previous romantic partner ( a 
"cold flame"). The data suggested that the rebound effect may not occur when the 
mentation is valenced. Their findings were in contrast with the retrospective study 
ofMuris and Merckelbach (1991, as cited by Muris et al, 1992) who found data to 
suggest that suppression of emotional material would produce strong rebound 
effects. 
Certainly, Wenzlaff, Wegner and Roper's (1988) series of experiments found 
that depressed individuals' efforts to suppress negatively valenced thoughts were 
undermined by the selection of emotionally valenced distracters. The data from 
these experiments suggested that depressed participants suffered from a particular 
deficit in the suppression of negatively valenced material, but were able to 
suppress positively valenced material. To assess this, Wenzlaff and others 
(Experiment 1) examined the valence of the thoughts preceding and following the 
specific intrusion. They found that the results supported the hypothesis that 
depressed individuals employ distracters that are emotionally related to the 
negative thoughts they are trying to suppress and, therefore serve to prompt 
awareness of the unwanted material. 
However even when supplied with positive distractors, and even while 
recognising that positive distractors are more efficient, depressed individuals chose 
negative distractors because they are more accessible (Wenzlaff et al, 1988, 
Experiment 3). 
Wenzlaff, Wegner and Klein ( 1991) found in a series of experiments that 
suppression creates a bond between the suppressed mentation and the associated 
valence of the context. In the first experiment they induced positive and negative 
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mood states with the associated suppression of a neutral mentation. In the 
subsequent free expression period, they found that if the induced mood state 
matched the previous suppression induced mood state, participants reported more 
intrusions of the negative stimulus. This was in comparison with participants 
whose mood induced states in the expression period were not matched with the 
mood induced state in the initial suppression period. Again this process is similar 
to that proposed by Wells and Papageorgiou (1994) in their conceptualisation of 
the process of worry. 
Wells and Papageorgiou ( 1994) believe that worry both tags and blocks 
emotional integration. The tagging increases the subsequent number of mood 
related intrusions. The blocking occurs because the conceptual nature of worry 
prevents further processing of images, and thus prevents integration of the 
emotional material. This is further maintained because the conceptual nature of 
worry consequently blocks the aversive physiological activation, and thus acts to 
maintain anxiety because it is also blocking emotional integration. This will 
therefore lead to a maintenance of intrusions as a symptom of incomplete 
emotional processing (Rachman, 1980). 
Distinguishing Between Thought and Images in the Suppression Paradigm 
The suppression paradigm does not distinguish between thought and images. 
Wegner and Gold (1992) did not distinguish between thoughts about the previous 
romantic partner and images of the previous romantic partner. They suggested that 
the rebound effect may not occur with emotional thoughts because the participants 
may, somehow, defend themselves from them. However, intrusive thoughts can be 
both pleasant and unpleasant (Edwards & Dickerson, 1987), and mentations about 
previous romantic partners could intuitively be either or both. Mentations about 
previous partners may also be images or conceptual or both. 
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In their investigation of the effects of suppression of personal intrusive 
thoughts, Kelly and Kahn ( 1994) apparently did not distinguish between thoughts 
and images. In fact they defined the mentation to be suppressed to include both the 
thought, and the image that comes to mind when the thought is initiated. 
Participants were asked to draw the resulting image, and then to label the image 
with one or two words. During the suppression period, participants were asked to 
suppress the image and/or the words used to describe the image with no 
distinction of which participants suppressed which type of mentation. 
The Influence of the Personal Relevance of the Mentation in Determining Whether 
There is a Rebound and/or Enhancement Effect 
Kelly and Kahn ( 1994, Experiment 1) found that valence played no part in the 
presence of a rebound effect. However in Experiment 2, they compared the 
suppression of a white bear with the participant's personally relevant intrusive 
thought/image. In this experiment, participants in the personally relevant intrusive 
thought/image condition were required to write down their most frequently 
occurring intrusive thought. Secondly, all participants were required to visualise a 
picture of the mentation that they were required to manipulate. They found that 
suppressing images of a white bear was significantly more difficult than 
suppressing images/thoughts of a personally relevant image/thought. 
They argued that the personal relevance of the mentation may play a key role in 
the ability of the participant to defend themselves from the intrusive mentation 
(Kelly & Kahn, 1994, Experiment 1 & 2). They suggest that this is because the 
--
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participant has had time to establish a network of distractor thoughts that will 
enable further intrusions to be defended. As such, participants given a new 
mentation to suppress will use the immediate environment, which in laboratory 
settings may be very sparse, whereas those who have already developed distractor 
thoughts will have a wider field to draw from. Kelly and Kahn (1994) suggest that 
experience with a mentation will reduce or reverse the rebound. They also suggest 
that a lack of continuity between expression and initial suppression contexts may 
account for the presence of the rebound effect. Specifically, they suggest that 
because participants are asked to express previously suppressed thoughts in a new 
setting, they are unable to access the network of distractors that might be available 
in the prior setting. 
Methodological Issues with the Suppression Paradigm 
As already mentioned, there are a number of crucial methodological points 
about using the findings of the suppression paradigm in order to develop a model 
of psychological disorders. Firstly, in all of the suppression experiments there is no 
distinction between the type of mentation (ie., images or thoughts) when 
instructing the participants. It may be that some participants are suppressing 
images and some are suppressing thoughts. It has not yet been established that the 
mechanism of suppression is the same with the different types of mentation 
(Roemer & Borkovec, 1993). It has been suggested that distinguishing between 
thought and images is important, as the nature of these different types of 
mentations may influence the efficacy of treatments such as the use of emotional 
processing (Foa & Kozak, 1986). 
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A further crucial methodological point is the relevance of the mentations that 
participants may be asked to suppress. For example, Salkovskis and Campbell 
(1994) found an enhancement effect for those participants who were asked to 
suppress personally relevant negatively valenced mentations. In contrast Kelly & 
Kahn (1994) suggested that experience with the mentation to be suppressed 
enabled the establishment of a distractor network, and hence a reduction or 
reversal of the rebound. Some researchers (eg., Muris et al., 1992) have argued 
that it is important to establish a predictable model in the laboratory before 
attempting to apply findings in the paradigm to models of clinical disorders. 
However, other findings (eg., Kelly & Kahn, 1994; Wenzlaff, Wegner and Roper, 
1988) indicate that the personal relevance of the mentation as well as the context 
in which the stimulus is suppressed may be significant in the paradoxical effect of 
suppression. Therefore trying to confine the research to the laboratory may not be 
the most fruitful way to proceed. 
Developing a Methodology 
There are also differences in the manner in which the number of intrusive 
mentations are measured in many of these experiments. Some have argued (eg., 
Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994) that the difference in the effect may be due to the 
manner in which the number of intrusive mentations are measured. For example, 
studies by Wegner et al. (1987), Wegner, Schneider, Knutson and McMahon 
( 1991) and Clark et al. ( 1991) where researchers found evidence of a rebound 
effect required participants to verbalise their stream of consciousness, and to ring a 
bell when they experienced the intrusive thought. Conversely, Merckelbach et al. 
(1991) and Muris et al. (1992), who did not find evidence of a rebound effect, 
used a different methodology. They asked participants to think silently and to 
press the button of an event marker when the intrusive thought occurred. 
However, Muris, Merckelbach and de Jong (1993) found that similar results are 
obtained using different methods (ie., streaming or recording) of measuring 
mentation intrusions. In their experiment, they found no evidence of a rebound 
effect with both groups. 
Borkovec and Roemer (1993) noted that it would be hard to 
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develop the methodology that enables us to look at the difference in defining a 
thought and defining an image, particularly in an experimental setting. Thought or 
conceptual activity is defined as a verbal linguistic activity (Borkovec & 
Lyonfields, 1993; Borkovec & Inz, 1990). Methodologies which would require 
verbalising the stream of consciousness would suit the experimental manipulations 
of thought but would not suit experimental manipulations of imagery. 
Accordingly, using a clicker or tick mechanism would most likely be conducive to 
both types of mentations. It would seem probable that participants who are asked 
to distinguish between thought and imagery in an experimental manipulation 
would find it difficult to suppress one type of mentation to concentrate on the 
other. Such instructions would most likely only confound the object of the 
experiment. 
Defining thought in this experimental manipulation was based on early 
experiments on insomnia by Borkovec and colleagues. In these early experiments, 
Gross and Borkovec (1982) instructed participants in a sleep setting that they 
were going to be awakened at some point to give a speech on "how to reduce 
inflation without reducing depression". As a result of this cognitive manipulation, 
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participants in this sleep group engaged in worry or predominantly verbal linguistic 
activity, and took twice as long to get to sleep. Accordingly, it was decided for 
this study to instruct participants in any thought suppression group that they 
would be required to present a speech at some future time. Participants who 
would be required to suppress an image would be induced to choose a particular 
scene. 
Zeitlin et. al. (1995) noted that the suppression paradigm may hold the key to 
understanding different patterns in different clinical disorders and hence enable us 
to build models of psychopathology. Specifically the empirical findings within this 
paradigm may enable us to understand what happens when clients attempt, 
consciously or not, to control their own symptomatology. Initially it is helpful to 
look at what happens in a nonclinical population, before selecting different clinical 
disorders to examine. It is recognised that there are always individuals who have 
undiagnosed levels of clinical depression, clinical anxiety and/or OCD. 
Accordingly measures of clinical depression, anxiety and OCD should be taken in 
order to account for confounding differences in the experimental conditions solely 
due to the presence of these disorders. 
Order of Presentation 
A further important methodological issue is the issue of the order of 
presentation. Some studies (eg., Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Borkovec & Inz, 1990) 
have implicated the order of presentation or preparedness in the development of 
psychopathological symptomatology. This would be in accordance with Gray's 
( 1982) theory of anxiety, which holds that the behavioural inhibition system is 
activated when there is a mismatch between incoming information and expected 
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information when the expected information is aversive. This has methodological 
consequences in two ways. Firstly, it is a strong rationale for presenting the clinical 
instruments last, so the aversive reaction to their content noted in the pilot study 
does not affect the participants in the differently valenced groups. Secondly, if 
Gray's theory is correct, then it may influence any within group manipulation of 
positive and negative valence. Accordingly, the manipulation ofvalencing the 
mentation should be between the nominated groups. 
Present Study 
In this context the present experiment is designed to examine the role of the 
three independent variables, Mentation, Valence and Thought Instruction over an 
interval. Mentation refers to the two types of cognitive activity: verbal, linguistic 
activity or thought, and images. Valence refers to two poles of valence, positive 
and negative. Thought instruction refers to suppression and non suppression. An 
outline of the implications of manipulating these variables will be presented before 
outlining the hypotheses. 
The nature of the mentation. If there is a difference in the manipulation of 
thoughts and images over the interval, then this tells us that the ability to suppress, 
then not suppress is different for thoughts and images. 
Valence. If there was a significant difference in the number ofvalenced 
mentations between the groups due to the valence of the mentation, this would tell 
us that whether the mentation was valenced either positively or negatively 
significantly affects the number of reported intrusions over the interval. 
Thought instruction. If there was a significant difference between the groups 
because of the thought instruction (suppression or non suppression) then this 
27 
manipulation would replicate the findings of the suppression paradigm and may 
enable us to understand the predeterminates of the existence of a rebound effect 
(eg.,Wegner et al., 1987; Clark et al., 1991), or a enhancement effect (eg., Lavy & 
van den Hout, 1990; Merckelbach et al, 1991). 
Valence and mentation. If there was an interaction effect between Valence and 
type of Mentation, this would mean that there is a difference in the number of self 
reported intrusions at different levels of the two independent variables, Valence 
and Mentation. That is to say that there is a different number of intrusions because 
of the nature of the mentation (thought or image) and the valence of the mentation 
(positive or negative). If as Borkovec and colleagues suggest, worry is composed 
predominantly of thoughts which are negatively valenced and there is a significant 
difference between the number of intrusions of negatively valenced thoughts 
compared to positively valenced images, then it might be argued that the 
conceptual nature of worry contributes to the uncontrollability of worry. 
Mentation and thought instruction. If there was an interaction effect for 
Mentation and Thought Instruction, there would be a different number of self 
reported intrusions for each type of mentation (thought, image) during suppression 
and non suppression. 
Valence and thought instruction. If there was an interaction effect for valence 
and thought instruction, this could be due to a significantly different number of 
intrusions dependent on the valence of the mentation during suppression and non 
suppression. For example, either negatively valenced mentations could result in 
significantly more intrusions during suppression or positively valenced mentations 
could do so during the suppression period. Alternatively, negatively valenced 
i 
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intrusions could result in significantly more intrusions than would positively 
valenced mentations result during the non suppression period. The influence of 
valence on intrusion during a period of an interval of suppression followed by non 
suppression may be helpful in understanding the processes involved in disorders 
which are negatively valenced and in which some form of suppression may be 
implicated. 
Mentation by valence by thought instruction. If there was a interaction effect 
for Mentation by Valence by Thought Instruction, it would mean that there was a 
difference in the number of self-reported intrusions for a particular combination of 
the three independent variables. The interpretation of such an effect would depend 
upon a more detailed analysis of the exact results. 
Aims and Hypotheses 
The intention of the project is to examine whether there is a difference in the 
suppression and subsequent non suppression of the two types of cognitive activity. 
In addition the project will examine whether the positive or negative valence of the 
cognitive activity has a differential effect during the interval of suppression, 
followed by non suppression. It is hypothesised that there will be a difference in 
the differential effects of the suppression of the two types ofvalenced mentation. 
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Method 
Participants 
Initial participants were 100 male and female undergraduates recruited from 
Churchlands and Joondalup campuses at Edith Cowan University, Western 
Australia. Participants, whose ages ranged from 18 to 60, were given no credit or 
financial benefits for their participation. 
Coursework assessments occurred for these students in the period following 
week 8 onwards and anecdotal reports indicated that high levels of anxiety and/or 
depression were common around assessment time. Anecdotal reports also reported 
that first year students were highly anxious at the commencement of semester one. 
Accordingly testing took place in weeks 2-5 of semester two because it was 
anticipated that this was the time ofleast anxiety and least depression for the 
participants. 
Design 
A 2 (Valence: positive, negative) by 2 (Mentation: thought, image) by 2 
(Thought Instruction: suppression, expression) design was used. Participants were 
randomly allocated to one of four groups; negative image, negative thought, 
positive image or positive thought, with Thought Instruction as a within-
participant variable. 
There were three parts to the experiment: the initial part, the experimental part 
and the manipulation checks. 
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Procedure 
On arrival, all participants were asked to wait for five minutes in another room 
before they were taken into the experimental room. This was to give participants 
the opportunity to calm themselves, if necessary, before the experiment was 
conducted. If participants seemed too rushed or anxious to wait, another 
appointment was offered. At the commencement of the experiment, participants 
were taken to a sound proof room, where they were invited to sit in a large 
comfortable chair. The room was approximately 2 square metres, and contained a 
comfortable chair, a desk and a spare chair. There was a two way mirror through 
which participants could be viewed. All participants were initially told that they 
were involved in a study of the way people think, and they were then given the 
chance to ask questions. Each participant was told that they could stop the 
experiment at any time, and that they could leave at any time. 
After each participant was given a few minutes to settle down, they were read 
the standardised instructions relevant to the group to which they were allocated. 
Students were randomly allocated to one of four groups (See Table 1). 
1 • 
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Table 1. 
Experimental Design 
Allocated Group 
1 . Negative Image 
2. Negative thought 
3. Positive image 
4. Positive thought 
Period 
Thought Instruction 
Suppression Non suppression 
Suppression Non suppression 
Suppression Non suppression 
Suppression Non suppression 
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Specifically participants in the image groups were asked to picture something 
that they found to be either positively or negatively valenced, respectively. 
Participants in the thought groups were asked to choose a topic for a speech on 
either a negative or positive topic. Participants in the thought groups were given 
lists of general topics that might be stimulus for topics that were personally 
relevant to them (Kelly & Kahn, 1994; see Table 2). All participants took as much 
time as they needed to choose the respective image or speech topic, and all 
participants were told that they did not have to disclose the content of their 
mentation. 
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Table 2. 
Optional Speech Topics Made Available To All Participants. 
Positively valenced topics: 
How my pet brings me joy. 
My TEE results and how they have shaped my future. 
The birth of a child. 
The love of my life and why I call him/her that. 
When I win Lotto ... 
Negatively valenced topics: 
My TEE results and how they have changed my future. 
Losing the love of my life. 
The abuse of children: should it be punished or forgotten. 
The death of a pet. 
The death of a parent and the influence on my life. 
Based on content of intrusive thoughts of 104 participants in Experiment 1, 
Kelly & Kahn, 1994. 
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When they had chosen the content of their mentation, they were told to "please 
indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how negative/positive (as appropriate) you would 
rate the topic." If participants rated the personally relevant mentation as less than 
7 /10, then participants were asked how they could change the mentation to make 
it more positively valenced or negatively ( as appropriate). The session continued if 
the participant rated the valence of the personally relevant mentation as greater 
than or equal to 7. 
The Experimental Period 
The suppression period. In this section of the experiment, participants were 
read the standardised instructions relevant to their assigned group (See Appendix 
A). Participants in the image groups were asked to 'not think about the agreed 
image for a period of 5 minutes.' If participants found that the image did come to 
mind, they were told to suppress the image, and to indicate that the image has 
returned by marking the worksheet which was placed in front of them (See 
Appendix B). In order to prepare for that possibility, participants were asked to 
have the pencil in their hand near the worksheet. When it was clear that the 
participant understood the instructions, the experimenter left the room, and 
returned after 5 minutes was completed. 
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Participants in the thought groups were read the standardised instructions 
relative to their group. They were told that they would be invited to 'give a speech 
on the agreed topic in approximately 10 minutes time'. They were told that the 
speech would be videotaped, but there would be no audience, and no one viewing 
the tape. Until then participants were told to suppress all thoughts of the speech, 
that they could think about anything during this time, but they should not think 
about the speech they were going to give. Participants were instructed however, 
that if they found their thoughts slipping towards the speech, they should suppress 
the thought, and mark the worksheet in front of them. In order to prepare for that, 
they were instructed to have the pencil in their hand near the paper. When it was 
clear that the participant understood the instructions, the experimenter left the 
room, and returned after 5 minutes was completed. 
The Non Suppression Period. When the experimenter re-entered the room, all 
participants were told 'that they should feel free to think about anything'. If they 
should think about the agreed mentation ( as appropriate) they should not suppress 
the mentation, "but continue to feel free to think about anything." If the agreed 
mentation did come to mind, then they were instructed to mark the worksheet in 
front of them. When participants indicated that they understood the instructions, 
the experimenter left the room for a period of 5 minutes. 
Overview of Manipulation Checks and Debriefing 
Participants were taken to a different room and they were asked to rate their 
compliance to instructions by indicating on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 is most 
compliant, and 1 is least compliant. 
34 
A detailed consent form was also given to participants to complete (See 
Appendix C). Although consent was obtained from all the participants at the 
commencement of the experiment, a detailed written consent form was given at 
this stage. In the consent form they were again told the role of the experiment, and 
they were also told that if they had experienced suicidal ideation, they would be 
contacted. They were then left to complete the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI : 
Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979), the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI : Beck, 
Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988), and the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive 
Inventory (MOCI: Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; Rachman & Hodgson, 
1980).These inventories are reproduced in Appendix D. 
All participants were monitored through a one way mirror during this phase to 
ensure that participants did not become suffer any ill effects. Participants were also 
given the opportunity in the final debriefing to explore any emotional after effects 
with the experimenter. In particular, participants were informed that they would be 
contacted by the experimenter if they indicated the presence of suicidal ideation. 
After completing the instruments a full debriefing was then conducted with each 
participant, and the purpose of the experiment was explained. 
Manipulation Checks 
Valence. Participants rated how positive or negative their personally relevant 
mentation was at the commencement of the experiment. Participants did this by 
I 
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rating the valence out of I 0, where IO is the maximum valence and 1 is the 
minimum valence. 
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Compliance to instructions. Participants were asked at the completion of the 
experiment to indicate whether they had complied with the instructions that were 
given to them. Participants did this by rating compliance out of 10, where 10 is the 
maximum compliance and I is the minimum compliance. 
Instruments 
Anxiety. Participants completed the BAI after the experimental phase of the 
study. The BAI was designed to measure those symptoms of anxiety that are 
minimally shared with those of depression, particularly those symptoms measured 
by the BD I. It consists of 21 items that measure the severity of self-reported 
anxiety. The total score is the sum of the ratings given by the examinee for the 21 
symptoms. Each symptom is rated on a 4 point scale ranging from O to 3. The 
maximum score is 63 points. The BAI score ranges are given as an aid in 
interpreting the intensity of self-reported anxiety. Total scores of 0-7 points are 
given the rating of minimal anxiety; scores of 8-15 indicate mild anxiety; scores of 
16-25 indicate moderate anxiety; and scores of 26-63 indicate severe anxiety. 
However Beck & Steer (1987, 1990) recommend some caution in using these 
ranges. The BAI was developed on psychiatric outpatients, but has been found to 
be effective with nonclinical samples (Dent & Salkovskis, 1986). In their study of 
nonclinical samples, Dent & Salkovskis (1986) found the mean BAI scores to be 
half those of clinical samples diagnosed with anxiety disorders (Fydrich, Dowdall 
& Chambless, 1990; Beck & Steer, 1990, 1987). For example, they found in a 
sample of 65 university students, that the mean BAI score was 11.08 (SD =9.10). 
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Similarly in a sample of 142 medical students, the mean BAI score was 8.89 (SD= 
7.30) and in a sample of 36 non students the mean BAI was 7.78 (SD= 5.65). 
Depression. Participants completed the BDI at the completion of the 
experiment. The BDI has been widely used for the assessment of symptoms 
associated with depression for both clinical and nonclinical populations (eg., Steer, 
Beck & Garrison, 1985). The purpose of using this instrument is to identify 
participants who are classified as clinically depressed. A total of 21 symptoms are 
included: participants are requested to rate the intensity of these symptoms on a 
scale from O to 3. Typical questions relate to such areas as sleep disturbance, sense 
of failure and loss of appetite. The inventory is self administered and takes from 5 
to 10 minutes. The total possible range of scores extends from a theoretical low of 
0 to a high of 63. No or minimal depression is indicated by a score ofless than 10, 
mild depression ranges from 10 to 16, moderate depression from 17 to 29 and 
severe depression from 30 to 63 (Beck & Steer, 1987). Evaluation of content, 
concurrent and discriminant validity as well as factor analysis has generally been 
favourable (Groth-Marnot, 1990). A meta-analysis of the different efforts to 
establish internal consistency has show them to range form . 73 to . 92 with a mean 
of. 86 (Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988). 
Obsessive compulsive disorder. Participants completed the MOC! (Hodgson & 
Rachman, 1977; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980) at the completion of the experiment. 
The MOC! is quick and easy to administer and consists of 30 items with true/false 
answers (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). In addition to 
a global obsessionality score, it gives four sub-scores; checking, washing/cleaning, 
slowness/repetitiveness and doubting/conscientiousness. The MOCI has been 
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found to differentiate between OCD and other anxiety disorders (Hodgson & 
Rachman, 1977; de Silva, 1994). In a study of 100 obsessional and 50 non-
obsessional patients, Hodgson and Rachman (1977) found that the MOCI clearly 
differentiated between the two groups: obsessional patients had a mean score of 
18.86 (S.D. = 4.92) while non-obsessional patients had a mean score of 9.27 (S.D. 
= 5.43). 
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Results 
The data from six participants were not included because they indicated during 
the post experimental manipulation checks that they had not followed instructions. 
Twenty participants withdrew from participation after recruitment because they 
found they did not have time to complete the experiment, or because of 
undisclosed personal reasons. The data from the remaining 74 participants were 
used to evaluate the hypothesis. 80% of the remaining participants were in the age 
category of 17-35 years (See Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. The age range of participants in the experiment. 
A greater number of females participated in the experiment (See Figure 2). As 
there is no evidence in the literature that gender difference contributes to 
differential suppression effects, this was not considered to be problematic for this 
experiment. 
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Figure 2. The percentage of males and females who participated in the 
experiment. 
The number of participants in each of the four groups was approximately even 
(See Table 3). 
Table 3. 
The number of participants in each cell after compliance check. 
Group Frequency 
negative image 19 
negative thought 17 
positive image 19 
positive thought 19 
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The BAI (Beck et al, 1988), BDI (Beck & Steer, 1987) and MOCI (Hodson & 
Rachman, 1977; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980) revealed varying levels of anxiety, 
depression and OCD in the experimental population. Overall, the mean scores for 
each of these disorders fell within the non-clinical range (see Table 4). 
Table 4. 
Mean scores on measures of Depression, Anxiety and Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder 
Instrument 
BAI 
BDI 
MOCI 
Mean 
8.1 
6.8 
5.7 
Std Deviation 
5.74 
5.64 
4.21 
Note. BAI- Beck Depression Inventory; BDI - Beck Depression Inventory; 
MOCI - Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Inventory. 
The means and standard deviations of self reported intrusions during the 
periods of suppression and non suppression are reported in Table 5. 
40 ; I 
,, 
1; 
''! 
,"1 
( 
'1 
I;'. 
41 
Table 5 
Means and standard deviations of self reported intrusions of valanced mentations 
during periods of suppression and non suppression. 
Suppression 
Non 
suppression 
Mentation Valence Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Image Negative 10.05 7.86 
Positive 8.10 4.20 
Total 9.08 6.3 
Thought Negative 5.18 3.68 
Positive 6.1 4.38 
Total 5.67 4.03 
Total Negative 7.75 6.64 
Positive 7.1 4.35 
Total 7.42 5.55 
Image Negative 5.26 4.98 
Positive 7.84 4.96 
Total 6.55 5.07 
Thought Negative 6.06 4.66 
Positive 8.53 8.51 
Total 7.36 6.98 
Total Negative 5.64 4.77 
Positive 8.18 6.88 
Total 6.95 6.05 
A 2 (Mentation: thought and image) by 2 (Valence: positive and negative) by 2 
(Thought instruction: suppression and non suppression) ANCOV A was done on 
the remaining data with BDI, BAI and MOCI scores added as covariates (See 
Appendix E). An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. 
Main Effects 
The nature of the mentation. The first hypothesis examines whether there is a 
difference in the suppression and subsequent non suppression of the two types of 
cognitive activity. As reported in Table 6, there was no significant main effect for 
Mentation, E(l, 67) = 1.467, p = .230. 
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The valence of the mentation. The hypothesis as to whether the positive or 
negative valence of the cognitive activity has a differential effect during the 
interval of suppression, then non suppression was tested next. As reported in 
Table 6, there was no significant main effect for Valence, E(l,67) = .700, p = .406 
Thought instruction. As reported in Table 6, there was no significant main 
effect for Thought Instruction, E(l, 67) = 1.241, p = .269. This tells us that the 
thought instruction (to suppress or not to suppress) did not result in a significantly 
different number of intrusions 
Interaction Effects 
Valence and mentation. As reported in Table 6, there was no interaction effect 
for Valence and Mentation, E(l, 67) = .518, p=.474. 
Mentation and thought instruction. As reported in Table 6, there was a 
significant interaction effect for thought instruction and mentation, E(l, 67) = 
9.145, p = .004 (See Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. A significant interaction effect for thought instruction and mentation. 
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Visual inspection of the interaction effect suggests that participants had more 
difficulty suppressing images than thoughts. An independent 1 test was performed 
on the two cognitive groups during suppression. The result of the 1 test indicates 
that during the suppression period, participants from the image groups had 
significantly more intrusions than participants in the thought groups, 1(72)= 2.758, 
p = .007. An independent 1 test was performed on the different mentation groups 
during the non suppression period. Results indicated that during non suppression, 
participants from the two different cognitive groups did not have significantly 
different numbers of intrusions, 1(72)= (-.572), p = .569. 
Valence and thought instruction. The influence of valence on intrusion during a 
period of an interval of suppression, then non suppression may be helpful in 
understanding the processes involved in disorders which are negatively valenced, 
and in which some form of suppression may be implicated. As reported in Table 6, 
the interaction effect just failed to reach significance, E(l, 67) = 3.957, p = .051 
(See Figure 4). A paired sample t test, 1(36) = 2.302, p = .027 for negatively 
valenced mentations revealed a significant decrease in the number of negative 
cognitions in the post suppression period. 
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Figure 4. The interaction effect for valence and thought instruction. 
Mentation by valence by thought instruction. As reported in Table 6, there was 
no interaction effect for Mentation by Valence by Thought instruction, E{l, 67) = 
.595, p = .443. 
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Discussion 
This project examined firstly whether there was a difference in the suppression 
and subsequent non suppression of the two types of cognitive activity, thoughts 
and images. The study also looked at the influence that valence had on the 
differential effects of suppression. It was hypothesised that there would be a 
difference in the effects of the suppression of the two types ofvalenced mentation. 
The hypothesis was supported. The specific empirical, theoretical and 
methodological implications of this will be discussed in two sections: the 
differential effects of suppressing the two types of mentations, and the differing 
effects of suppressing valenced cognitive activity. A summary of the implications 
will then be presented. 
It is Easier to Suppress Thoughts Compared to Images. 
There was a significant interaction effect for thought instruction and mentation. 
The data suggest that participants had more difficulty suppressing images than 
thoughts but that there was no significant difference in the number of intrusions in 
the post suppression period. What are the implications of this? 
The Suppression Paradigm. Firstly, in terms of the suppression paradigm, we 
can say, comparatively speaking, there is an enhancement effect for images, but 
not for thoughts. That is to say, participants experience a paradoxical effect when 
they try to suppress images, compared to when they try to suppress thoughts. 
During the post suppression period, there is no significantly different paradoxical 
effect between the two groups. 
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We can infer from these data that one of the determinates of an enhancement 
effect is the specified nature of the mentation, that an intrusion is more likely to 
occur if it is an image rather than a verbal linguistic cognition. It was noted that 
the suppression paradigm may hold the key to understanding different patterns in 
different clinical disorders, and in doing so help us to build models of 
psychopathology (Zeitlin et al., 1995). This empirical finding enables us to 
understand what happens when clients attempt, consciously or not, to control their 
own symptomatology. Attempting to suppress an image or images will result in an 
initial paradoxical effect, whereas attempts to suppress verbal linguistic cognitions 
will result in significantly fewer intrusions. 
Specifically, if a participant attempts suppression of a personally relevant 
valenced image, and finds as demonstrated in this experiment a paradoxical effect 
of the intrusion returning to mind again and again, then its possible that the 
perception of uncontrollability will result. This effect however will only continue 
until the impetus to suppress is withdrawn, and then there is no significant 
difference in the number of intrusions. Caution should be taken with extrapolating 
this finding into clinical disorders too quickly, as this particular result does not 
distinguish between positively and negatively valenced mentations. That is to say, 
both positively and negatively valenced images are more difficult to suppress than 
positively and negatively valenced verbal linguistic cognitions, and the valence of 
intrusions associated with clinical disorders such as worry, OCD and PTSD are 
defined as negatively valenced. 
Methodological limitations with using the enhancement/rebound label. It is 
because of the significant differences between the number of intrusions in the 
mentation groups that we say there is an enhancement effect for images compared 
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to thoughts. Strictly speaking, we would compare the number of intrusions with a 
group who have not been exposed to any instructions not to suppress. 
Similarly we might ask whether the equivalency of intrusions in the post 
suppression period is actually what Wegner would call a rebound effect. The 
labelling of a paradoxical effect as either an enhancement/rebound effect according 
to Wegner and colleagues has been determined by comparision with a group that 
has not been instructed to suppress any form of mentation. In this experiment, only 
comparative declarations have been made. If necessary further investigations may 
be warranted as necessary to ascertain if the findings here are necessarily 
comparable to the "rebound and/or enhancement effect" as labelled in the 
suppression paradigm. With this caution that the effect found refers to a 
comparative effect, we will however refer to the effect found as an 
enhancement/rebound effect. 
It is interesting to note overall that the thought instruction, to suppress or not 
to suppress, did not result in a significantly different number of intrusions. What 
this experiment indicates is that while overall there may appear to be no 
paradoxical effect, (eg., a rebound effect as in Wegner et al., 1987 and Clark et al., 
1991 or an enhancement effect as in Lavy & van den Hout, 1990; Merckelbach et 
al, 1991 ), in actual fact suppression of a personally relevant valenced verbal 
linguistic mentation results in an enhancement effect. It is suggested that previous 
inconsistencies in empirical findings in the suppression paradigm may have been 
due to not distinguishing the type of mentation to be suppressed. An alternative 
explanation might be that conceptual activity may result in a paradoxical effect if 
there is sufficient power in the experiment. One way of increasing power would be 
by increasing the number of participants. This is a consideration that should be 
allowed for in future experiments 
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To summarise, the methodological significance of this is that previous 
inconsistencies in the suppression paradigm may have been due to the nature of the 
mentation. The finding that suppression of a personally relevant image results in 
significantly more intrusions than suppression of a personally relevant verbal 
linguistic mentation in the initial period of suppression may account for previous 
inconsistent results in the suppression paradigm. An alternative explanation is that 
the experiment was underpowered, to allow for there to be a significant effect for 
conceptual activity. 
Theoretical Implications of Finding that Images are Harder than Thoughts to 
Suppress 
Trinder and Salkovskis ( 1994) noted the role that appraisal of initial intrusions 
may have in the development of disorders such as OCD and PTSD. With both of 
these disorders, the nature of the intrusions may include both thoughts and images. 
Quite likely the appraisal of the paradoxical effect, due to a largely imaginal 
content, may lead clients to experience a sense of uncontrollability. Resulting 
compulsions to compensate for the alarming intrusions may, as suggested by 
Salkovskis (1989, 1990), be implicated in the aetiology of OCD. Experiencing 
unwanted intrusive cognitive activity has been found to be experienced by 80% of 
the nonclinical population (Rachman and de Silva, 1978). The similarity between 
normal intrusive thoughts and clinical intrusive thoughts led Rachman ( 1978) to 
speculate that normal intrusive thoughts may play a role in the aetiology of OCD. 
This was later extended by Salkovskis ( 1985, 1989) in a cognitive behavioural 
hypothesis ofOCD. 
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The high rate of intrusions may also be implicated in the aetiology of PTSD. 
Intuitively, it seems likely that the re-experiencing of a traumatic event that occurs 
with PTSD (APA, 1994) would be in the form of images, probably images of the 
actual traumatic event. The appraisal of the subsequent high rate of intrusions 
would lead to associated symptomatology that is associated with PTSD, such as 
for example continued distress and physiological arousal (APA, 1994). This 
finding is consistent with Trinder and Salkovskis' (1994) assertion that 
suppression may be responsible for the aetiology and maintenance of disorders 
such as PTSD and OCD. 
The same argument cannot however account for a sense of uncontrollability 
that occurs with worry in both clinical and non clinical populations (Borkovec et 
al, 1990; AP A, 1994) if as has been found, the content of worry is predominantly 
verbal linguistic (Borkovec & Lyonfields, 1993; Borkovec & Inz, 1990). It has 
been suggested that the perception of the uncontrollability of worry may be due to 
its conceptual nature. This study found that suppression of conceptual mentations 
results in significantly fewer intrusions than suppression of imaginal mentations. 
Therefore the lower rate of intrusions of conceptual activity are comparatively 
least likely to lead to an appraisal that worry is uncontrollable. We can speculate 
as to whether there is a threshold at which an individual decides that the 
paradoxical effect is uncontrollable. Perhaps this could be a focus for further 
research. 
To summarise, it was noted that the suppression paradigm may hold the key to 
understanding different patterns in different clinical disorders, and in doing so help 
us to build models of psychopathology (Zeitlin et al., 1995). This empirical finding 
enables us to understand what happens when clients attempt, consciously or not, 
I 
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to control their own symptomatology. Caution should be taken with extrapolating 
this finding into clinical disorders too quickly as this particular result does not 
distinguish between positively and negatively valenced mentations. However, 
while it continues to be possible to argue that this finding may concur with a 
hypothesis that appraisal of the paradoxical effect results in the aetiology of OCD 
and PTSD, this would not be the case with worry. That is to say, it would not be 
the case with worry because ofworry's predominantly verbal linguistic nature and 
the comparative lower rate of conceptual intrusions. To argue more 
comprehensibly it is important to look at the role of valence in these processes. 
The Role of Valence 
The project also_examined whether the positive or negative valence of the 
cognitive activity had a differential effect during the interval of suppression, then 
non suppression. 
The influence of positive or negative valence on intrusions during the interval 
of suppression, then non suppression may be helpful in understanding the 
processes involved in disorders which are negatively valenced, and in which some 
form of suppression may be implicated. The interaction effect between valence and 
thought instruction just failed to reach significance. There are two reasons why we 
should consider the effect to be significant: first, because the probability level was 
.051, and second because variability as measured by the covariates was measured 
at the end of the experiment. It may be that removing the variability as measured 
by the covariates also removed the shared variability of the dependent variable 
which was affected by the independent variables. Ideally this is usually avoided by ,, 
taking the measures for the covariates at the commencement of the experiment, 
but in this experiment the instruments used to measure covariates were negatively 
l 
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valenced, and would have confounded the experiment. In summary, we consider 
the probability level of the interaction between valence and thought instruction to 
be significant. 
Subsequent tests showed that negative mentations compared to positive 
mentations decrease significantly in the post suppression period. What is also 
interesting is that this finding applies for both negatively valenced thoughts and 
negatively valenced images, as the higher interaction between mentation and 
valence and thought instruction was not significant. 
Suppressing Negative Thoughts and Images Results in Significantly Fewer 
Intrusions in the Post Suppression Period 
The application of the finding that negatively valenced mentations decrease 
significantly in the post suppression period will be discussed by firstly addressing 
the application to the suppression paradigm, and then by discussing the theoretical 
implications. 
Application to the Suppression paradigm 
This finding may shed some light on the conflicting findings in the suppression 
paradigm. Perhaps the inconsistencies are due to two things: firstly as already 
discussed, not distinguishing between both the nature of the mentation to be 
suppressed, and/or secondly, not consistently distinguishing between the valence 
(either positive or negative) of the cognitive activity to be suppressed. 
Theoretical implications 
This project has shown that a paradoxical effect is significantly more likely to 
occur with images, than with thoughts. It has also shown that the number of 
negatively valenced intrusions compared to positively valenced intrusions 
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significantly decreases in the post suppression period. Addressing these findings 
may be a fruitful way of explaining inconsistencies and establishing a means of 
developing models of psychopathology. For example, it has been previously 
argued that suppression of negatively valenced mentation is hampered by selection 
of negatively valenced distractors 
In contrast to Wenzlaff et al (1988) this experiment found that there was no 
significant difference in the ability to suppress positive or negatively valenced 
mentations, but rather that suppression of negative mentations led to significantly 
fewer intrusions in the post suppression period when compared with suppression 
of positively valenced mentations. The results of this suggest that participants are 
not confined to selecting only negative distractors, as there is no difference 
between the number of positively and negatively valenced intrusions during 
suppression. Further, distraction, if that is the process that is occurring, is possible 
in the post suppression period for negatively valenced cognitive activity. 
The role of valence in determining a paradoxical effect. Some empirical studies 
had indicated that only suppression of neutrally valenced mentation resulted in a 
paradoxical effect (Muris et al, 1992; Lavy and van den Hout, 1990; Wegner & 
Gold, 1992), whereas other studies had indicated that suppression of a valenced 
cognition resulted in a paradoxical effect (Muris and Merckelbach, 1991, as cited 
by Muris et al, 1992). This project has demonstrated that a paradoxical effect is 
predetermined by suppression ofvalenced mentation, but may be influenced by the 
nature of the mentation, and whether the valence is positive or negative. 
The personal relevance of the stimulus and the valence appear to be influential 
in determining this effect. This study may clarify Wenzlaff, Wegner & Klein's 
• 
( 1991) assertion that the contextual valence of the suppressed mentation 
determines the subsequent paradoxical effect in the post suppression period. In 
their experiment, only a neutral stimulus was used, but it was paired with a 
positive or negative valenced context. In the post suppression period they found 
that matched contextual valence across the suppression and the non suppression 
period results in greater intrusions than non matched contextual valence. 
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This study determined that the polarity of the valence may also determine the 
presence of subsequent intrusions. The two studies differ in that Wenzlaff et al' s 
( 1991) study did not use personally relevant valenced mentations, but artificially 
induced valence onto a neutral stimulus. The theoretical implications ofWenzlaff 
et al' s ( 1991) study is that polarity of the induced valence becomes bonded to the 
stimulus during suppression, and seems to act as a involuntary reminder of the 
stimulus. The polarity of the personally relevant valenced stimuli, as shown in this 
study, actually determines the non suppression rate of intrusion, suggesting either 
of two things: firstly, that the personal relevance of the valenced stimuli 
determines the result, or secondly, that the polarity of the valence determines the 
result. In the former case, it has been suggested that the personal relevance of the 
stimuli enables the participant to have already established a distractor network 
(Wegner & Gold, 1992). If this is true, then it should be true for both positive or 
negative stimuli. This suggestion is not consistent with the results of this study. In 
the latter case, in which the polarity of the mentation determines the result, there 
are a number of speculative reasons why this might be so. Firstly, perhaps the 
negatively valenced stimuli is so aversive, that the participants continue to 
suppress, even though they report that they have stopped suppressing. Whereas 
for the positive group, the stimuli is not so aversive, and the need to avoid the 
stimulus is not as necessary. If this is the reason, then it implies a level of mental 
control. 
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Such a position would be consonant with Well's (1994) theoretical position on 
worry that although the initial intrusion may be automatic, the continuing 
processing is a consciously controlled process. He believes that although worry 
may be initiated automatically and involuntarily, that it is a conscious controlled 
processing activity requiring large amounts of processing capacity. One reason he 
suggests for its uncontrollability is because of appraisals surrounding the 
involuntary initiation of worry. 
We have seen however that the conceptual intrusions are comparatively less 
frequent than imaginal intrusions. As already mentioned, it would be necessary to 
establish a threshold of the number of intrusions occurring that initiate a labelling 
of uncontrollability before one could argue that the results of this study are totally 
consonant with Wells' theoretical position. 
This study however does not clarify Wells and Papageorgiou's (1994) 
argument that worry both tags and blocks emotional integration. They argued that 
tagging, a generalising of retrieval cues, increases the subsequent number of mood 
related intrusions. This study has found that an attempt to suppress negatively 
valenced thoughts and images results in a post suppression decrease in the number 
of intrusions when compared to positively valenced intrusive activity. The results 
of this study seem to imply that tagging does not occur, or if it does, that it is 
under conscious control. An alternative explanation is that suppression of 
negatively valenced mentations results in a degree of emotional integration, as 
evidenced by the reduction of intrusive mentations (Rachman, 1980). That is to 
say, blocking of emotional integration that is said to occur because ofworry's 
conceptual nature does not occur because of the process of suppression. 
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The results of this study seem to warrant further investigation with reference 
to reconciling Wells and Papageorgiou's position. Such an investigation might 
include physiological measures that might indicate if a lack of an anxiety response 
is maintaining a blocking of emotional integration. 
To summarise, the finding of this study that the negative polarity of the valence 
of a mentation results in a significant decrease in a post suppression decrease in 
intrusive mentations implies one of two things. First, that emotional processing 
occurs for negatively valenced mentations when suppressed, as evidenced by the 
reduction of intrusive mentations (Rachman, 1980). Alternatively, that processing 
of intrusive activity is under conscious control, and the resulting decrease in 
negatively valenced mentation in a post suppression period is because of a 
conscious desire to avoid the aversively valenced mentations. 
Summary 
This study has enabled us to clarify whether the conceptual nature of worry 
contributes to the appraisal that clinical and non-clinical populations have that 
worry is uncontrollable. It was proposed that it was unlikely that the conceptual 
nature of worry contributes to this appraisal of uncontrollability because 
suppression of conceptual activity results in significantly fewer intrusions than 
suppression of imaginal cognitive activity. In coming to this position, this study 
has identified pre-determinates of paradoxical effects in the suppression paradigm 
that occur when participants attempt to suppress cognitive activity. Specifically 
this study found that one predeterminate of a paradoxical effect is the nature of the 
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mentation: comparatively speaking, suppression of a thought is significantly less 
likely than an image to result in intrusive mentations. This finding could be a focus 
for further investigation, with an emphasis on comparing the significant difference 
with a presuppression period to enable a baseline measure to be taken. Such 
further investigation would enable generalising the results into treatment. It 
appears that another predeterminate is the polarity of the valence. Specifically, 
suppression of negatively valenced mentations results in a significant decrease in 
intrusions in the post suppression period. 
This study also enabled us to examine more closely some empirical findings, 
and relative theoretical positions. If as has been postulated, suppression of 
negatively valenced mentations results in emotional processing, then the finding 
that suppressing negatively valenced mentations results in significantly fewer 
intrusions as compared to positive mentations in the post suppression period has a 
number of implications for treatment of disorders where intrusive cognitive 
activity is a symptom. For example, does thought stopping actually work? Does 
the resulting discovery that the number of intrusions decrease result in an appraisal 
in the post suppression period that one can actually stop worrying? This result 
would indicate that that might be the case. It is then understandable that clients 
may choose suppression as a way of controlling worry, as these results indicate 
that it may be effective. 
Alternatively, it has been postulated that consistent with Wells' (1994) 
position, there is a level of conscious control over intrusion in a post suppression 
period, which results in an avoidance of the aversively valenced mentation. Further 
investigation is necessary to resolve these questions. Later investigations might 
--
include extending to clinical samples of specific disorders to enable the 
establishment of psychopathological models (Zeitman et al, 1985), and hence 
potential bases for treatment. 
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Appendix A 
Instructions to each group 
Group 1. Suppression of negative image 
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• I would like you to picture something that you would find very negative. It may 
be something that you found to be very distressing or made you very angry or 
upset. Please take your time to think of something that you consider to be very 
negative. I would like you to imagine yourself in that situation. Picture what is 
around you. Picture what you are feeling. Picture your surroundings. Is there 
anyone else there? What does it look like? What does it smell like. What colour 
is it? What does it feel like? When you feel that you have an image clearly in 
your mind, lease let me know. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is the least 
distressing, and 10 is the most distressing how would you rate it?. (If greater 
than 7, proceed. if not, ask what would make this more negative.) 
• Now, I would like you to not think about the agreed image for the next 5 
minutes. If the image does come to mind, I would like you to suppress the image. 
Please however, indicate that the image has returned by marking the sheet in 
front of you. In order to prepare for that I would like you to have the pencil in your 
hand near the paper.(Participant should indicate that he/she understands.) I will 
tell you when the five minutes is up. 
(Experimenter leaves the room, and returns after five minutes) 
******* 
• Now, I would like you to feel free to think about anything for the next five 
minutes. If you think about the agreed image, don't suppress the image, but 
continue to feel free to think about anything. If the image does come to mind, then 
please mark the paper in front of you. 
******** 
• Finally, Please rate on a scale of 1- 10 how negative you found the image to be 
now. Remember that 1 is least negative and 10 is the most negative. 
• Please also indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how well you think you complied with 
the instructions that were given to you. 
********* 
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Group 2. Suppression of negative thought 
• I would like you to choose a topic for a speech from the list in front of you. Please 
choose the topic that you find the most emotionally negative. I would like you to 
pick a speech that you find the most upsetting or distressing. If you can't find a 
topic there that you don't find upsetting, then please feel free to think of a speech 
topic that you find personally upsetting. Take some time to think of a speech topic 
that is appropriate. 
• Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how negative you find the topic.( If greater 
than 7 than proceed, if not ask how you can change the topic to make it more 
positive or negative). 
• Now in about ten minutes I would like you to give this speech on the agreed topic. 
Before then I would like you to suppress all thoughts of the speech. You can think 
about anything during this time, but please do not think about the speech that 
you are going to deliver. If you do find your thoughts slipping towards it, then 
please suppress the thoughts, but indicate on the sheet in front of you. In order to 
prepare for that I would like you to have the pencil in your hand near the 
paper.(Participant should indicate that he/she understands.) I will tell you when 
the five minutes is up. 
*******-
• Now, I would like you to feel free to think about anything for the next five 
minutes. If you think about the agreed speech, don't suppress the speech, but 
continue to feel free to think about anything. If the speech does come to mind, 
however, then please mark the paper in front of you. 
"'""""'"'"'"'"'"'"'""""' 
• Finally please indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how positive you find the speech 
topic to be now. 
• Please also indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how well you think you complied with 
the instructions that were given to you. (That is, firstly by choosing a negative 
speech topic, attempting to suppress the topic, and finally thinking freely.) 
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Group 3. Suppression of positive image 
• I would like you to picture something that you would find very positive. It may be 
something that you found to make you very happy or joyful. Please take your 
time to think of something that you consider to be very positive. I would like you to 
imagine yourself in that positive situation. Picture what is around you. Picture 
what you are feeling. Picture your surroundings. Is there anyone else there? 
What does it look like? What does it smell like. What colour is it? What does it 
feel like? When you feel that you have an image clearly in your mind, lease let 
me know. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is the least distressing, and 1 O is the 
most distressing how would you rate it?. (If greater than 7, proceed. if not, ask 
what would make this more negative. ) 
• 
• Now, I would like you to not think about the agreed image for the next 5 minutes. 
If the image does come to mind, I would like you to suppress the image. Please 
however, indicate that the image has returned by marking the sheet in front of 
you. In order to prepare for that I would like you to have the pencil in your hand 
near the paper.(Participant should indicate that he/she understands.) I will tell 
you when the five minutes is up. 
(Experimenter leaves the room, and returns after five minutes) 
******* 
• Now, I would like you to feel free to think about anything for the next five 
minutes. If you think about the agreed image, don't suppress the image, but 
continue to feel free to think about anything. If the image does come to mind, then 
please mark the paper in front of you. 
******** 
• Finally, Please rate on a scale of 1- 1 O how negative you found the image to be 
now. Remember that 1 is least negative and 1 O is the most negative. 
********* 
• Please also indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how well you think you complied with 
the instructions that were given to you. 
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Group 4. Suppression of positive thought 
• I would like you to choose a topic for a speech from the list in front of you. Please 
choose the topic that you find the most emotionally positive. I would like you to 
pick a speech that you find the most happy or joyful. If you can't find a topic there 
that you don't find positive and uplifting, then please feel free to think of a speech 
topic that you find personally positive and uplifting. Take some time to think of a 
speech topic that is appropriate. (Participant should indicate when ready) 
• Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 1 O how positive you find the topic.( If greater 
than 7 than proceed, if not ask how you can change the topic to make it more 
positive or negative). 
• Now in about ten minutes I would like you to give this speech on the agreed topic. 
Before then I would like you to suppress all thoughts of the speech. You can think 
about anything during this time, but please do not think about the speech that 
you are going to deliver. If you do find your thoughts slipping towards it, then 
please suppress the thoughts, but indicate on the sheet in front of you. In order to 
prepare for that I would like you to have the pencil in your hand near the 
paper.(Participant should indicate that he/she understands.) I will tell you when 
the five minutes is up. 
• Now, I would like you to feel free to think about anything for the next five 
minutes. If you think about the agreed speech, don't suppress the speech, but 
continue to feel free to think about anything. If the speech does come to mind, 
however, then please mark the paper in front of you. 
""""""""""""'' 
• Finally please indicate on a scale of 1 to 1 O how negative you found the speech 
topic to be now. 
*****-******* 
Please also indicate on a scale of 1 to 1 O how well you think you complied with the 
instructions that were given to you. (That is, firstly by choosing a positive speech 
topic, attempting to suppress the topic, and finally thinking freely.) 
Appendix B 
Work sheet 1 for group 1 
Work sheet 2 for group 2 
Work sheet 3 for group 3 
Work sheet 4 for group 4 
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Work Sheet 1 
A. Rate your negative image on a scale of 1 to 10 
(where 1 is least negative and 10 is most negative). 
/10 
****************************************** 
B. Period 1 
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 
2 11 20 29 38 47 56 65 74 83 92 
3 12 21 30 39 48 57 66 75 84 93 
4 13 22 31 40 49 58 67 76 85 94 
5 14 23 32 41 50 59 68 77 86 95 
6 15 24 33 42 51 60 69 78 87 96 
7 16 25 34 43 52 61 70 79 88 97 
8 17 26 35 44 53 62 71 80 89 98 
9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 99 
*********************************************** 
C. Period 2. 
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 
2 11 20 29 38 47 56 65 74 83 92 
3 12 21 30 39 48 57 66 75 84 93 
4 13 22 31 40 49 58 67 76 85 94 
5 14 23 32 41 50 59 68 77 86 95 
6 15 24 33 42 51 60 69 78 87 96 
7 16 25 34 43 52 61 70 79 88 97 
8 17 26 35 44 53 62 71 80 89 98 
9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 99 
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*************************************************************** 
D. Please rate how negative you found the image to be 
now. 
/10. 
E. Please rate how well you complied with the 
instructions that were given to you. 
/10. 
F. Please feel free to make any comments about the 
testing or the instructions. 
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Work Sheet 2 
A. Rate your negative speech topic on a scale of 1 to 10 
(where 1 is least negative and 10 is most negative). 
/10 
****************************************** 
B. Period 1 
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 
2 11 20 29 38 47 56 65 74 83 92 
3 12 21 30 39 48 57 66 75 84 93 
4 13 22 31 40 49 58 67 76 85 94 
5 14 23 32 41 50 59 68 77 86 95 
6 15 24 33 42 51 60 69 78 87 96 
7 16 25 34 43 52 61 70 79 88 97 
8 17 26 35 44 53 62 71 80 89 98 
9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 99 
************************************************************** 
C. Period 2. 
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 
2 11 20 29 38 47 56 65 74 83 92 
3 12 21 30 39 48 57 66 75 84 93 
4 13 22 31 40 49 58 67 76 85 94 
5 14 23 32 41 50 59 68 77 86 95 
6 15 24 33 42 51 60 69 78 87 96 
7 16 25 34 43 52 61 70 79 88 97 
8 17 26 35 44 53 62 71 80 89 98 
9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 99 
************************************************************** 
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D. Please rate how negative you found the speech topic 
to be now. 
/10. 
E. Please rate how well you complied with the 
instructions that were given to you. 
/10. 
F. Please feel free to make any comments about the 
testing or the instructions. 
77 
Work Sheet 3 
A. Rate your positive image on a scale of 1 to 10 (where 
1 is least positive and 10 is most positive). 
/10 
****************************************** 
B. Period 1 
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 
2 11 20 29 38 47 56 65 74 83 92 
3 12 21 30 39 48 57 66 75 84 93 
4 13 22 31 40 49 58 67 76 85 94 
5 14 23 32 41 50 59 68 77 86 95 
6 15 24 33 42 51 60 69 78 87 96 
7 16 25 34 43 52 61 70 79 88 97 
8 17 26 35 44 53 62 71 80 89 98 
9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 99 
*************************************************************** 
C. Period 2. 
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 
2 11 20 29 38 47 56 65 74 83 92 
3 12 21 30 39 48 57 66 75 84 93 
4 13 22 31 40 49 58 67 76 85 94 
5 14 23 32 41 50 59 68 77 86 95 
6 15 24 33 42 51 60 69 78 87 96 
7 16 25 34 43 52 61 70 79 88 97 
8 17 26 35 44 53 62 71 80 89 98 
9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 99 
*************************************************************** 
D. Please rate how positive you found the image to be 
now. 
/10. 
E. Please rate how well you complied with the 
instructions that were given to you. 
/10. 
F. Please feel free to make any comments about the 
testing or the instructions. 
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Work Sheet 4 
A. Rate your positive speech topic on a scale of 1 to 10 
(where 1 is least positive and 10 is most positive). 
/10 
****************************************** 
B. Period 1 
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 
2 11 20 29 38 47 56 65 74 83 92 
3 12 21 30 39 48 57 66 75 84 93 
4 13 22 31 40 49 58 67 76 85 94 
5 14 23 32 41 50 59 68 77 86 95 
6 15 24 33 42 51 60 69 78 87 96 
7 16 25 34 43 52 61 70 79 88 97 
8 17 26 35 44 53 62 71 80 89 98 
9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 99 
*************************************************************** 
C. Period 2. 
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 
2 11 20 29 38 47 56 65 74 83 92 
3 12 21 30 39 48 57 66 75 84 93 
4 13 22 31 40 49 58 67 76 85 94 
5 14 23 32 41 50 59 68 77 86 95 
6 15 24 33 42 51 60 69 78 87 96 
7 16 25 34 43 52 61 70 79 88 97 
8 17 26 35 44 53 62 71 80 89 98 
9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 99 
*************************************************************** 
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D. Please rate how positive you found the speech topic 
to be now. 
/10. 
E. Please rate how well you complied with the 
instructions that were given to you. 
/10. 
F. Please feel free to make any comments about the 
testing or the instructions. 
Appendix C 
INVESTIGATION INTO TYPES OF MENTATION 
NAME; 
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I hereby consent to the experiment and give permission to use the obtained data in 
publication. I will not be identifiable as a participant in this experiment in any 
material published. 
Signature: 
Telephone: 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for helping me with my research. I am investigating the processes 
involved in the suppression of different types of mentation as part of a project which 
will be used to complete a course requirement for a Master of Psychology (Clinical) 
at Edith Cowan University. 
The experiment will take approximately 20 minutes. You will be asked to complete a 
questionnaire which will ask you about thoughts and feelings you may have 
experienced in the past week. Then you will be asked to think about or to imagine a 
vivid object that is personally relevant to you. You will then be asked not to think 
about the nominated object for a period of five minutes.You will then be asked to 
relax for a brief period. If you indicate in the questionnaire that you are 
contemplating suicide, then you may be contacted and referred to a counselling 
service. You will not be contacted under any other circumstances, but if you have 
any questions related to these questionnaires then you may contact the 
experimenter. 
This research will help us to understand thought processes. Should you have any 
questions or concerns about the experiment, immediately after the experiment or 
subsequently, then do not hesitate to contact me care of the School of Psychology, 
Joondalup Campus, Joondalup. You are reminded that you can withdraw from the 
project at any time. Your participation is voluntary. Your participation (or withdrawal) 
will have no bearing on your enrolment. Your name and a contact number is 
required, but all identifying data will be removed from the experimental data. If you 
choose to submit a questionnaire without your name, then filling in and submitting 
the questionnaire will be taken as consent to the experiment. 
Yours faithfully, 
Jacinta Willans 
 
 
A/Professor Helmes 
 
 
Appendix D 
Psychometric Instruments Used as Measures of 
Covariance. 
Beck Anxiety Inventory 
Beck Depression Inventory. 
Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory 
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Beck Anxiety Inventory 
Instructions 
Below is a list of common symptoms of anxiety. Please carefully read each item in the list. Indicate 
how much you have been bothered by each symptom during the PAST WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY, by 
placing an [X] in the corresponding space in the column next to each symptom. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
Numbness or tingling 
Feeling hot. 
Wobbliness in legs. 
Unable to relax. 
Fear of the worst. 
Dizzy or lightheaded 
Heart pounding or racing. 
Unsteady. 
Terrified. 
Nervous. 
Feelings of choking. 
Hands trembling. 
Shaky. 
Fear of losing control. 
Difficulty breathing. 
Fear of dying. 
Scared. 
Indigestion or discomfort in 
abdomen. 
Faint. 
Face flushing. 
Sweating [not due to heat]. 
NOT 
AT 
ALL 
MILDLY 
It did not 
bother me 
much 
MODERATELY 
It was very 
unpleasant, 
but I could 
stand it 
SEVERELY 
I could barely 
stand it 
Beck Depression Inventory 
Instructions: 
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On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully. Then pick out the one statement in each group which 
best describes the way you have been feeling over the PAST WEEK INCLUDING TOOAY. Circle the number beside the statement you picked. If several 
statements in a group seem lo apply equally well, circle each one. Be sure to read all the statements in each group before making your choice. 
1. 
2. 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 
1 
2 
3 
I do not feel sad. 
I feel sad. 
I am sad all time and I can't snap out of ii. 
I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand ii. 
I am not particularly discouraged about the future. 
I fell discouraged about the future. 
I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
I feel that the future is hopeless and that things 
cannot improve. 
3. 0 I do not feel like a failure. 
1 I feel I have failed more than the average person 
2 As I look back on my life, all I can see are a lot 
of failures. 
3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person. 
4. 0 
1 
2 
3 
5. 0 
1 
2 
3 
6. 0 
1 
2 
3 
7. 0 
1 
2 
3 
8. 0 
1 
2 
3 
9. 0 
2 
3 
10. 0 
1 
2. 
3 
11. 0 
1 
2 
3 
I get as much satisfaction out of things as I 
used to. 
I don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
I don't get real satisfaction out of anything 
anymore. 
I am dissatisfied or bored with everything. 
I don't feel particularly guilty. 
I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
I feel quite guilty most of the lime. 
I feel guilty all of the time. 
I don't feel I am being punished. 
I feel I may be punished 
I expect lo be punished. 
I feel I am being punished. 
I don't feel disappointed in myself. 
I am disappointed in myself. 
I am disgusted with myself. 
I hale myself 
I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else. 
I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or 
mistakes. 
I blame myself all the time for my faults. 
I blame myself for every1hing bad that happens. 
I don't have any thoughts of killing myself. 
I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not 
carry them out. 
I would like to kill myself. 
I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
I don't cry anymore than usual. 
I cry more now than I used to. 
I cry all the time now. 
I used lo be able to cry, but now I can't cry even 
though I want lo. 
I am no more irritated now than I ever am. 
I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used 
I feel irritated all the time now. 
I don't get irritated at all by the things that used 
to irritate me. 
12. 0 
1 
2 
3 
13. 0 
1 
2 
3 
14. 0 
1 
2 
3 
15. 0 
1 
2 
3 
16. 0 
1 
2 
3 
17. 0 
1 
2 
3 
18. 0 
1 
2 
3 
19. 0 
1 
2 
3 
20. 0 
1 
2 
3 
I have not lost interest in other people. 
I am less interested in other people than I used 
to be. 
I have lost most of my interest in other people. 
I have lost all of my interest in other people. 
I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
I have greater difficulty in making decisions than 
before. 
I can't make decisions al all anymore. 
I don't feel I look any worse than I used to. 
I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
I feel that there are permanent changes in my 
appearance that make me look unattractive. 
I believe that I look ugly. 
I can work about as well as before. 
It takes an extra effort to gel started at doing 
something. 
I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
I can't do any work at all. 
I can sleep as well as usual. 
I don't sleep as well as I used to. 
I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it 
hard to gel back to sleep. 
I wake up several hours earlier than usual and 
cannot gel back, to sleep. 
I don't get any more tired than usual. 
I get tired more easily than I used to. 
I gel tired from doing almost anything. 
I am too tired lo do anything. 
My appetite is no worse than usual. 
My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
My appetite is much worse now. 
I have no appetite al all anymore. 
I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately. 
I have lost more than 2.5 kilograms. 
I have lost more than 5 kilograms. 
I have lost more than 7 kilograms. 
I am no more worried about my health than usual. 
I am worried about physical problems such as 
aches and pains, or upset stomach or constipation. 
I am very worried about physical problems and 
its hard lo think of much else. 
I am so worried about my physical problems that 
I cannot think about anything else. 
21 0 I have not noticed any recent change in my 
interest in sex. 
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
2 I am much less interested in sex now. 
3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory. 
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Instructions: Please answer each question by putting a circle around the 'True' or 'False' following the 
question. There are no right or wrong answeres, and no trick questions. Work quickly and do not think 
too long about the exact meaning of the question. 
1 I avoid using public telephones because of possible contamination True False 
2 I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of them True False 
3 I am more concerned than most people about honesty True False 
4 I am often late because I can't seem to get through everything on time True False 
5 I don't worry unduly about contamination if I touch an animal True False 
6 I frequently have to check things (e.g. gas or water taps, doors, etc.) 
several times True False 
7 I have a very strict conscience True False 
8 I find that almost every day I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that 
come into my mind against my will True False 
9 I do not unduly worry if I accidently bump into somebody. True False 
10 I usually have serious doubts about the simple everyday things I do True False 
11 Neither of my parents was very strict during my childhood True False 
12 I tend to get behind in my work because I repeat things over and 
over again. True False 
13 I use only an average amount of soap True False 
14 Some numbers are extremely unlucky True False 
15 I do not check letters over and over again before posting them True False 
16 I do not take a long time to dress in the morning True False 
17 I am not excessively concerned about cleanliness True False 
18 One of my major problems is that I pay too much attention to detail True False 
19 I can use well-kept toilets without any hesitation True False 
20 My major problem is repeated checking True False 
21 I am not unduly concerned about cleanliness True False 
22 I do not tend to check things more than one True False 
23 I do not stikc to a very strict routine when doing ordinary things True False 
24 My hands do not feel dirty after touching money True False 
25 I don not usually count when doing a routine task True False 
26 I take rather a long time to complete my washing in the morning True False 
27 I do not use a great deal of antiseptics True False 
28 I spend a lot of time every day checking things over and over again True False 
29 Hanging and folding my clothes at night does not take up a lot of time True False 
30 Even when I do something very carefully I often feel that it is not quite 
right True False 
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Appendix E 
ANCOVA Table 
Source df Sum Mean square F Observed 
of squares power 
Between Subjects 
Intercept 1 1472.381 1472.381 30.662 1.000 
BAI 1 5.439 5.439 .113 .063 
BDI 1 39.802 39.802 .829 .146 
MOCI 1 19.579 19.579 .408 .096 
Mentation 1 70.451 70.451 1.467 .223 
Valence 1 33.597 33.597 .700 .131 
Mentation by 
Valence 1 24.861 24.861 .518 .109 
Error 67 3217.291 48.019 
Within Subjects 
Thought 
Instruction 1 22.337 22.337 1.241 .196 
Thought 
Instruction 
by BAI 1 .342 342 .019 .052 
Thought 
Instruction 
by BDI 1 15.420 15.420 .858 .150 
Thought 
Instruction 
byMOCI 1 1.702 1.702 .759 .061 
Thought 
Instruction 
by 
Mentation 1 164.577 164.577 9.145** .846 
Thought 
Instruction 
by Valence 1 71.217 71.217 3.957 .500 
Thought 
Instruction 
by Mentation 
by Valence 1 10.706 10.706 .595 .118 
Error 67 1205.821 17.997 
Note *p < .05. **p<.01. 
